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Abstract 
Leading studies of the English modal auxiliaries generally classify the epistemic 
category as bearer of personal beliefs. Proposals that, when conveying 
quantitative properties and physical characteristics, this modal class may perform 
objective and alethic functions remain peripheral to the discussions. As a result, 
connotations which relate to physical evidence, conform to the epistemology, 
pragmatics and ethics of disciplinary domains and contribute to the woof and 
warp of professional or ‘multimedia genres’ abide unattended. 
The study explores whether objective and alethic functions of epistemic modals 
may deserve attention in analyses of professional discourse. An outline of 
influential descriptions of modal categories reveals a common line in their 
conceptualisation of epistemic particles as bearers of subjective beliefs. The 
stance invites a reflection on the epistemico-pragmatic evolution which brought 
‘beliefs’, in science, to depend on accessible evidence, mathematical models, 
inter-subjective knowledge and multimedia representations. Scholarly arguments 
follow which emphasise the epistemico-pragmatic grounds of ‘probability’ 
modals, in ‘possible worlds’ genres, and propose specifications of objective and 
alethic categories. The aims and ‘possible worlds’ relevant to scientific 
investigation and argumentation are briefly touched on. Then, evidence of two 
epistemico-pragmatic functions is offered through the characterisation of modals 
in texts of different realms of science. 
The discussion indicates that in scientific reports epistemic modals bear 
connotations which must be worked out in light of verified knowledge. The latter 
is space/time-related, inter-subjective and bound to conceptual models and inter-
disciplinary frames of reference. These specifications constitute alethic and 
objective meaning sources relevant to the practices of thought communities. 
Therefore, descriptive models of professional discourse might benefit if they were 
inclusive of the two pragmatic functions.  
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1 Introduction 
The English modal auxiliaries have been a main topic of interest in theoretical and applied 
linguistic studies. Most of the discussions have dealt in depth with the grammar elements of 
the system and provided explanations of the possible meanings of each constituent. However, 
the complexity of the subject has led to no satisfactory interpretative model (Hoye 2005; 
Lyons 1994; Palmer 1979, 2003; Papafragou 2006). The debate is still open both on whether 
modal forms should be considered polysemous or monosemous, and on whether the epistemic 
class is an offshoot of the root modals or vice versa (Coates 1983; Kratzer 1977; Traugott 
1989). Researchers from both camps have provided interesting details on the syntactic 
properties of each modal particle, and determined their frequency and distribution in 
sentences either created introspectively or attested in spoken and written corpora (Biber et al. 
2007, Palmer 1979; Quirk et al. 1985). 
 
In the literature, there appears to be general agreement on the possible meanings carried by 
the deontic or root category (Brown & Levinson 2009; Leech 1986). However, the 
connotations conveyed by the epistemic class seem not to share the same consensus. In fact, 
the functions of epistemic modals are characterized according to two schools of thought. One, 
‘subjective/relativistic’ oriented, frames epistemic elements mainly as bearers of personal 
beliefs and opinions; the other, ‘naive realism’ based, argues for the widening of the semantic 
domain with alethic and objective subclasses. The latter would encompass connotations 
interweaving pragmatic patterns, physical properties and statistical data relevant to research 
communities (Lyons 1994). 
 
For different reasons, among which easier access to their studies, the model elaborated by the 
‘relativists’ prevails in language research and teaching environments. Whereas, the addition of 
the sub-classes proposed by the ‘realists’ remains unexplored in both general and specialist 
language studies. Influential essays by the relativists mention proposals that discourse 
analyses should open to objective and alethic meaning strands, but the specific functions have 
been deemed either of little relevance to ordinary speech or non-indicative of ‘real-world 
causes’ (Palmer 1979; Sweetser 1998). Consequently, the significance of epistemic modals 
remains fastened to degrees of possibility or necessity related to subjective opinions and 
beliefs (Halliday 2004). 
 
Undoubtedly, the descriptive models elaborated by the relativists provide interesting 
observations and insights into modal functions. However, the emphasis on subjective 
evaluation seems to obscure distinctions between beliefs based on sheer looking, testimony 
and authority and ‘belief ascriptions’ involving objective evidence, non-verbal and pragmatic 
patterns which foster multimedia discourse. More effective studies of domain-specific 
language may require taking into account the influence that systematic observation of 
physical phenomena, presuppositions, technical skills, purposes and representation patterns 
shared by the interactants may have on what linguistic forms can mean and suggest (Stalnaker 
1999). In this perspective, the qualification of modal meaning should be also in light of “… 
shared assumptions, values, beliefs, and conventions of behaviour that define the culture of 
particular discourse communities” (Widdowson 2003:68). 
 
The present study explores whether strands of objective and alethic meaning proposed by the 
‘realists’ may be relevant to the description and interpretation of professional and/or 
multimedia genres (Lemke 1998). This constellation of ‘discursive practices’ binds 
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communities of researchers in an interdisciplinary quest to advance understanding, visual 
representations and explanations of “… innumerable arguments from nature” (Galilei [1610] 
1989:57)1. The participants in the research and argumentation activities are aware of the 
complexity and variability of natural phenomena. Their academic training and every day 
experience with thought and laboratory experiments incite them to investigate and discuss 
physical entities and processes as being in constant flux, and thus, amenable only to 
probabilistic propositions and provisional claims (Toulmin 1980).  
 
The study first outlines influential studies on modal categories and traces a common line in 
their definition of the epistemic mode in terms of subjective ‘beliefs’. The topic invites a 
reflection on the meaning of the concept of ‘belief’ in science as well as on the historical 
event which led to the expansion of the word reference-frame from subjective or authority-
based speculations, to verified, quantitative properties. The origin of the epistemico-pragmatic 
transition is located in the founding of the scientific method by Galileo Galilei (1564-1642). It 
is recalled that, in the effort to free science from authoritative and dogmatic impositions, 
Galileo characterises beliefs in terms of their origins, grounds and reference frames and 
argues for a net separation between scientific and other discourse genres (Galilei [1623] - 
1957). Reference is made to the epistemology and argumentation style proposed by the 
scientist which render research activities, investigation tools, reasoning processes, and 
findings ostensible, repeatable, probabilistic, and open-ended.  
 
The considerations on the specific nature of scientific beliefs and argumentation lead to 
discuss proposals by scholars, in different academic fields, who sustain a pragmatic approach 
to discourse analysis and propose that modal functions should be widened with the inclusion 
of objective and alethic sub-classes. The argument binding these proposals is located in the 
specification that the meaning of modal particles should be established in light of knowledge 
patterns, context of interaction, purposes and codes shared by participants in the speech event. 
These elements are deemed responsible for ‘possible worlds’ knowledge frames and belief 
attributions (Stalnaker 1999). The ‘possible worlds’ or ‘realms’ of knowledge investigated and 
represented by science are briefly delineated. Then, the analysis of modal particles in 
scientific texts offers evidence of objective and alethic functions in multimedia genres. The 
discussion invites the conclusion that more adequate descriptions of scientific discourse may 
require widening the conceptualisation of modal functions to include the two sub-categories. 
Besides allowing more comprehensive definitions of the relative epistemico-semantic 
elements, the enrichment could contribute to more effective research and interpretation 
models of professional communication.  
 
2 Framing a complex grammar-semantic system 
The modal auxiliaries belong to the macro-class of grammar elements comprising verbs, 
adverbs, nouns and adjectives considered as a cross-linguistic facility (Palmer 2003; Hoye 
2005). In social interactions, the variegated group of linguistic forms can indicate/mitigate 
request, advice, obligation, permission, apologies, conventional rules (Brown & Levinson 
2009; Leech 1986). In interpersonal exchanges of ideas, they can attenuate assertions, convey 
degrees of individual certitude and/or doubt about possibility of events (Austin 1970). In 
professional discourse, along with the aforementioned shades of meaning, they can subsume 
and grade confidence in investigation techniques, instrumental precision, standards of 
statistical data, as well as highlight deductive inference, reliability of claims and contingency 
                                                 
1 All the quotations from Galileo Galilei’s works are from the texts reported in the references. 
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of conclusions (Lyons 1994). 
 
Influential linguistic studies indicate that modality items can function both as grammar and as 
meaning elements, thus, their description belongs to the area of grammar-semantic research 
(Huddleston 1984; Palmer 1979, 2003). They provide intra- and inter-linguistic descriptions 
of the relative particles and deal in depth with “ … the distinctive grammatical properties of 
the central and peripheral modal auxiliaries …” (Huddleston 1984:164). In view of frequency 
of occurrence in spoken and written texts, they define can, could, may, might, shall, should, 
will, would, must, ought to as central modal auxiliaries (Leech 1975).  
 
A finely detailed theoretical, descriptive and terminological framework for modal auxiliaries 
(henceforth modals) is offered in A Comprehensive Grammar of the English Language 
(CGEL), by Quirk et al. (1985). The notable study, which has been defined as “ … probably 
the most detailed grammar of present day English yet written …” (Biber et al 2007:7) 
classifies modal functions into two meaning types: 
 
 a)  Those expressing ‘permission’, ‘obligation’, and ‘volition,’ which involve 
  some kind of intrinsic human control over events, and  
 
 b)  Those such as ‘possibility’, ‘necessity’, and ‘prediction’, which do not involve 
  human control of events, but do typically involve human judgement of what is 
  or is not likely to happen (Quirk et al. 1985:219, original indentations and 
  capitals). 
 
The components of group ‘a’ are then categorised as bearers of deontic relations, those of 
group ‘b’ as conveyers of epistemic inference. CGEL explains that deontic modals carry 
intrinsic meaning since they relates to actions and events controlled by human or other agents. 
The epistemic class conveys extrinsic meaning because it refers to the logical status of events 
or states and is mainly related to grading of possibility, necessity or prediction (Quirk et al. 
1985:219). CGEL observes that since each modal element belongs to both the deontic and 
epistemic classes, “… each one of them has both intrinsic and extrinsic use, …” (Quirk et al. 
1985:219), i.e., each particle can bear either one or the other category of meaning. The 
discussion then details other peculiar semantic characteristics of modals. These include: trans-
categorisation of functions, scalar value of elements, multiple time reference (might/should, 
may/can - may relate to past, present and future events), interchangeability of meaning 
(may/can/will, should/ought to - may indicate possibility/probability, expectation, etc.). In 
view of the complexity and polysemy of the modal system elements, CGEL observes that “… 
the use of modal verbs is one of the more problematic areas of English grammar” (Quirk et al. 
1985:220). 
 
The Authors of CGEL concur with other grammar-semantic experts that the difficulty met in 
accounting for the choice and significance of modals may arise from the fact “… that their 
meaning has both a logical and a practical (or pragmatic) element” (Leech 1975:66 - original 
parenthesis). But the question about whether, besides subjective opinions, the epistemic class 
can be related to pragmatic, dialectic and ontological characteristics of discourse domains 
appears to remain under-explored. In fact, almost all the studies on the functions of this 
category seem to echo the conclusion adduced by CGEL: 
 
 
LSP Journal, Vol.2, No.1 (2011) / http://lsp.cbs.dk 
 
20 
 
At its most general, modality may be defined as the manner in which the meaning 
of a clause is qualified so as to reflect the speaker’s judgement of the likelihood of 
the proposition it expresses being true (Quirk et al. 1985:219). 
 
The comprehensive and insightful analysis of modal categories provided in CGEL is 
interrelated with many other significant contributions on the subject (Hoye 2005). Some of 
these enrich grammar-semantic descriptions with theories about both the possible diachronic 
evolution and the cognitive implications of each particle. Among these, Palmer’s Modality 
and English Modals (1979) is undoubtedly the most enlightening and thorough description of 
the grammar-logic of the English modal system. In the classic text, the eminent scholar 
describes each modal particle in relation to mood, voice, time, and other logico-semantic 
features. Palmer observes that “… there are not just two kinds of modality” (Palmer 1979:35). 
Thus, he widens the modal classes with two subclasses termed ‘dynamic possibility’ and 
‘dynamic necessity’ which express ‘subject oriented and neutral possibility’, respectively 
(Palmer 1979:71). He explains in depth features of deontic and epistemic modality and 
comments that nuances of the former class tend to shade into the ones of the latter, thus a net 
distinction between the possible meanings of the two categories is hard to draw.  
 
Palmer then focuses on the connotations of the epistemic category, and specifies that this class 
conveys meanings such as “… I judge it to be possible…., I make it to be possible” (Palmer 
1979:38). Then, he characterises further the relative elements as bears of “… the modality of 
propositions rather than of actions, states, events, etc.” (Palmer 1979:41). The meaning space 
of the epistemic functions is set within “… degrees of possibility and necessity …. marked by 
MAY and MUST”, respectively” (Palmer 1979:41 - original capital letters). After highlighting 
the tentative implications of might, would, should, Palmer specifies that will subsumes 
expectation (Palmer 1979:41, original italics). He illustrates the logical implications of ‘will’ 
and ‘must’ through the expressions: 
 
a) John will be in his office.   
b) John must be in his office. 
 
In utterance ‘a’ “…Will… merely makes a confident statement, …” while in ‘b’ “ … must 
suggests a confident conclusion from the evidence available” (Palmer 1979:47). The model of 
analysis proposed by Palmer is insightful and progressive. In his later contributions, he 
introduces the concept of ‘evidential modality’ and explains: “There are two main kinds of 
evidence – report and sensory” (Palmer 2003:7). The latter refers to sensory evidence, the 
former “… to what has been or is said by individuals or by community” (Palmer 2003:8). 
Thereafter, Palmer specifies that: “… Epistemic MUST and WILL have some characteristics 
of Evidential modality, for they signal conclusions that are based on evidence …” (Palmer 
2003:8, original capitals). The two functions are defined by indicating the grounds for the 
assumptions: 
 
a. They must be in the office. (The lights are on)  
b. They’ll be in the office. (They always are at this time) (Palmer 2003:8 - original  
   parenthesis). 
 
In the utterances, “… MUST indicates a conclusion based on available evidence …. while 
WILL suggests a conclusion from what is generally the case …” (Palmer 2003:8 - original 
capitals). The two types of conclusion are further defined in terms of underlying reasoning 
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process as ‘deductive’ and ‘assumptive’, respectively, which relates them to both reports and 
sensory experience. Afterwards, Palmer re-classes the four modal types: “Epistemic and 
Evidential modality might, then, be characterised as “Propositional modality”, Deontic and 
Dynamic modality as “Event modality” (Palmer 2003:8, original indentation). 
 
Palmer’s constant, remarkable work on modality has continually added new lymph into modal 
studies and has influenced deeply most branches of language sciences. His studies are mines 
of insightful information on the particles. However, in the model and in the discussions there 
seems to be no indication as to whether, besides subjective inference, the conclusions 
conveyed by ‘deductive’ and ‘assumptive’ propositions may draw on statistical data and 
proven evidence of physical phenomena. In his classic text, Palmer touches on the reason for 
the exclusion of ‘objective’ functions in his analyses: “Alethic modality has been the main 
concern of logicians, but it has little place in ordinary language” (Palmer 1979:3). This 
argument is both sound and suggestive. By specifying the study domain, Palmer leaves open 
the possibility that, in realms where “… beliefs are grounded in both mathematically precise 
calculations of probabilities and proven evidence, modals may have other characteristics” 
(Lyons 1994:793).  
 
Halliday ([1985] 2004) describes modal functions within his socio-linguistic theory of 
language according to which speech evolution involves a shift from ‘congruent’ to 
metaphorical representations. In light of this theory, Halliday terms deontic and epistemic 
modal categories as modulation and modalization, respectively. Thus, the modulation class is 
the ‘congruent’ semantic representation of modality since it performs the original or ‘root’ 
function of modals and carries intrinsic meaning. The modalization category is the 
metaphorical representation of modality resulting from a process of ‘metaphorization’ from 
the congruent expression to its abstract representation. Halliday defines the diachronic 
evolution from modulation to modalization as the fruit of a rhetorical technique or departure 
“… from the explicitly subjective orientation of the proposal or proposition, in the sense that 
the speaker or writer shifts the modal responsibility embodied in subjecthood to somebody or 
something else” (Halliday 2004:628).  
 
The shift from congruent to metaphorical meaning is then presented as a product of grammar 
mechanics whereby ‘subjective explicit’ sentences containing mental verbs such as ‘believe’, 
‘suppose’, ‘think’ are turned into ‘objective implicit impersonal’ expressions as follows:  
 
I think Peter knows. (congruent, subjective explicit) 
 
becomes 
 
Peter probably knows/Peter may know. (metaphorical, objective implicit) 
 
Halliday explains that while the first sentence states explicitly that the probability is decided 
subjectively, the second is a projecting clause which claims that the probability is objective 
(Halliday 2004:615). He comments that when speakers use the metaphorical version, (i.e., 
impersonal reference) they are using one “… of the many ways of expressing their opinions- 
or rather, perhaps, of dissimulating the fact that they are expressing their opinions …” 
(Halliday 1985:334, 2004:616). This theorem is supported by some context-free sentences 
which should embody the metaphorical shift proposed. Halliday concedes that the metaphoric 
mode expands the congruent mode significantly. But he restates his assessment about the 
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objective epistemic class: “Modality represents the speaker’s angle on the validity of the 
assertion …”, adding “…most of the objectifying metaphors are different ways of claiming 
objective certainty or necessity for something that is in fact a matter of opinion” (Halliday 
2004:624-625). 
 
The theoretical model proposed by Halliday is perceived as stimulating and in harmony with 
his model of diachronic language change from concrete lexical references to abstract 
grammatical metaphors. However, the descriptions seem to focus mainly on the performative 
functions of expressions and modals therein. No indications emerge on the role of reasoning 
supported by non-verbal codes, evidence of ‘things’ and contextual reference frames which 
can determine meaning in constative utterances and diagrammatic discourse (Austin 1975; 
Toulmin 1980). In terms of the linguistic model, the sentence reported in Halliday 1994:641: 
 
A magnitude-6 quake can cause severe damage|| if it is centered under a populated 
area. 
 
can be framed as a ‘metaphorical version’ of a ‘congruent expression’. Out of original 
context, the statement leaves unspecified the scale of reference and other parameters which 
can determine the quake’s destructive effects. Direct experience with the aftermath of 
earthquakes of magnitude-6, on the Richter scale, in seismic zones, populated by ancient 
buildings, makes me hesitant about whether the modal ‘can’, in the expression, may be 
classified as a token of subjective belief ascription. 
 
Sweetser (1998) proposes a description of modals which interweaves ideas developed by 
Palmer and Halliday with the concept of force-dynamic proposed by Talmy (Sweetser 1998). 
First, she outlines a diachronic perspective on the evolution of the particles’ system: 
 
Historically, the English modals developed from non-modal meaning (such as 
physical strength or force e.g. OE magan “be strong”, “be able”) “deontic” modal 
meanings, and later still broadened to include the epistemic reading as well.  
(Sweetser 1998:50 - original parenthesis and indentation marks). 
 
The pragma-linguist observes that deontic or root modals denote real-world obligation, 
permission, or ability whereas the epistemic modals denote necessity, or possibility in 
reasoning. She also mentions the ambiguity that lingers on decisions about the two sets of 
senses when analysing statements. Thus, she proposes a monosemous reading of the two 
canonical categories, and defines the epistemic class as “… an extension of the basic root 
sense … which is strongly motivated by the surrounding linguistic system” (Sweetser 
1998:50). 
 
In line with Palmer’s proposal, Sweetser suggests a framing of the epistemic class as modality 
of propositions. Then, she expands her description with Talmy’s schema which describes 
modals as bearers of force-dynamic influences. She explains that, in the domain of social 
interactions, root modals convey force dynamic relationship whereby ‘may’ implies “…. a 
potential, but absent barrier, ‘must’ a compelling force directing the subject toward an act” 
(Sweetser 1998:52). Sweetser explains that by way of metaphorical extension 
(metaphorization in Halliday’s model) these implications filter into the epistemic class. In 
epistemic expressions, “…may implies absence of barriers in the world of reasoning from 
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premise to conclusion, must the available direct evidence compels me to the conclusion that 
…” (Sweetser 1998:59 - original italics). 
 
In passing, Sweetser mentions Lyons’s proposal to expand the epistemic class with other 
categories of meaning. She defines the suggestion as being useful but untenable, and supports 
her stance with the attested utterance: 
 
You must be Seth Sweetser’s sister. 
 
She explains that in this statement ‘must’ was triggered by the information on her name-tag, 
thus, the occurrence of the modal does not imply that ‘real world’ causes may have lead the 
speaker to utter the statement. She claims instead “…that he was obliged to conclude that it 
was true because the available informational premises caused him to reason thus” (Sweetser 
1998:57 - original italics). 
 
Occasionally, my surname, on conference name-tags, has elicited colleagues to address me 
with: 
 
You must be a relative of Quentin Tarantino. 
 
In such circumstances, the amusing supposition was probably triggered by concomitant 
factors. Namely, the sameness of my surname and that of the famous film director, indications 
of my provenance, on my tag, foreknowledge about the director’s Italian origins. I have never 
thought that the sole surname on my tag could have compelled colleagues to conclude that I 
was related to the American producer. Probably, the ‘must’ occurring in similar expressions 
subsumes speculations about probabilities rather than ‘paralogistic’ conclusions.  
 
Sweetser mentions proposals which associate the epistemic category to acts of stating or 
binding. But she finds them ‘not quite accurate’. She concludes her thought stimulating 
discussion by defining the force and barrier theory as a unifying view which proves epistemic 
modality to be: “… an essentially metaphorical application of our sociophysical modal 
concepts to the epistemic world” (Sweetser 1998:68).  
 
The descriptive models briefly delineated above have contributed immensely to a better 
understanding of modal system. They have opened new perspectives on possible nuances of 
each element as well as motivated and influenced most of the research on the relative system 
in the literature. In its turn, each successive study has enriched the debate on fundamental 
aspects of the meaning making process (Hoye 2005). However, the models proposed appear 
to focus mostly on semantic features of the particles, in ordinary speech interactions, and to 
share a common line in qualifying the epistemic class as bearer of degrees of subjective 
beliefs. Undoubtedly, contributions from the individual speaker are fundamental in meaning 
construction and interpretation. But these complex processes depend on ‘tacit knowledge’ 
shared by interactants, the context of culture and situation, non-verbal codes and practical 
skills which partake in ‘possible worlds’ belief ascription (Austin 1970; Stalnaker 1999). 
More adequate analyses of modals might, thus, require taking into account all these 
epistemico-pragmatic factors as well as disciplinary matrices of scientific domains. Besides 
providing elements for the conceptualisation of modals as bearers of evidence-based 
knowledge, the expansion could shed more light on “… that class of beliefs which we are 
bound to adopt or not to adopt by our reasoning process” (Sweetser 1998:57-58). 
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3 The path from opinions to explanatory truths 
Lyons (1994) discusses mental verbs, such as ‘believe’, ‘suppose’, ‘guess’, ‘think’, ‘know’, as 
fundamental concepts in the evolution of society and speech. But he specifies that among 
them only ‘know’ is a factive verb since it usually refers to direct experience of the facts 
reported. He qualifies the others as ‘verbs of beliefs’, and relates them to subjective 
appraisals, opinions and speculations about experience and events. He adds that belief verbs 
do not commit the users/reporters to validating their assertions since what one believes cannot 
be questioned and emphasises the demonstrable nature of beliefs in probative genres (Lyons 
1994).  
 
Specifically, in science, the word ‘belief’ carries different implications from those associated 
with the common sense notion. Quinn (2007) explains that when used in disciplinary context 
the term implies that the participants in the discursive interactions share the same 
commitment to the disciplinary programme. This includes theories, models and descriptions 
of physical phenomena, which can be challenged, but which pending further improvement, 
are taken as adequate explanations. The physicist adds that the expression ‘scientists believe 
that’ should convey the meaning: “Most scientists agree that the preponderance of evidence 
favours the interpretation that …. and furthermore, there is no evidence that directly 
contradicts that interpretation” (Quinn 2007:8). 
 
Scientists have emphasised the evidence-based concept of ‘belief’ in scientific discourse since 
Galileo Galilei (1564-1642) opened the path to modern science. The scientist acknowledges 
the importance of sharing ‘beliefs’ for effective communication, but argues that in different 
context of culture and interests, the term-concept will bear connotations which draw on 
dissimilar reference frames. He points out, that in ordinary speech, ‘beliefs’ can thrive on 
feelings, guesses, hunches or suppositions which generally have a subjective basis. The 
interactants may have acquaintance with the object of ‘belief’ since they usually share 
conventions and other components of primary-culture. But they may not necessarily share 
concepts with identical quantitative reference frames. Galileo adds that the ‘beliefs’ sustaining 
ordinary conversation nourish on personal trust and everyday experience, thus, they require 
neither measurable quantities nor proofs for verification (Galilei [1615] 1957).  
 
Galileo distinguishes the ‘beliefs’ driving ordinary speech from those grounded on religious 
teachings. First, he observes that common and religious ‘beliefs’ build on a form of 
persuasion based on rhetoric, evocative and emotive associations. Then, he observes that 
religious credos are grounded on the Holy Scripture, itself a body of ‘beliefs’ which thrives on 
the imagination and faith of its adherents. He defines this class of ‘beliefs’ appropriate aids for 
the human quest for a kind of truth which should need no tangible proofs for validation. 
Galileo separates the office of theology from that of science by specifying that the aim of: “… 
religious Scripture is to teach adherents how to go to heaven, whereas the aim of scientific 
pursuit is to understand how the heavens go” (Galilei [1615] 1957:212). He specifies that in 
order to achieve this goal, science cannot draw solely on first principles, it must build on 
observation of phenomena, measurements and verification while complying with nature 
which  
 
… is inexorable and immutable and does not care at all whether or not her 
recondite reasons and modes of operations are revealed to human understanding; 
she never transgresses the laws imposed upon her, or cares a whit whether her 
LSP Journal, Vol.2, No.1 (2011) / http://lsp.cbs.dk 
 
25 
 
abstruse reasons and methods of operation are understandable to men (Galilei 
[1613] 2008:104-105).  
 
Thus, to decipher the laws that govern natural events more than to believe one must want to 
know. In other words, Galileo proposes a direct approach to knowledge acquisition and 
expansion and separates beliefs based on fiducial acceptance of philosophic doctrines from 
‘beliefs’ grounded on plausible arguments about verifiable facts and proven evidence. 
 
In further defence of verifiable knowledge and ‘demonstrative argumentation’, the scientist 
contrasts the content and purposes of scientific discourse with those of literary genres “… in 
which the least important thing is whether what is written in them is true” (Galilei [1623] 
2008:183). He acknowledges the importance of verbal communication and defines “… 
writing an invention stupendous above all others” (Galilei [1632] 1981:105). But he questions 
the trust which Peripatetic philosophers have in ‘words writ on paper’ and/or knowledge 
established by revered authorities. Galileo considers the teachings and ideas available in 
Aristotelian philosophy important, but in need of revision and updating. Thus, he argues that 
understanding nature requires constant systematic investigation with the aid of instruments, 
experimental activities and trained reasoning. The latter must rely on mathematical and 
geometric concepts and their relative representation procedures. In defiance of Peripatetic 
doctrine Galileo defines nature as a book which:  
 
… cannot be understood unless one first learns to comprehend the language and 
read the letters in which it is composed. It is written in the language of 
mathematics and its characters are triangles, circles and other geometric figures, 
without which it is humanly impossible to understand a single word of it …” 
(Galilei [1623] 1957:238).  
 
The gist of this metaphor can be appreciated by recalling that scientists were groping in the 
dark about the characteristic of DNA until the geometric and mathematic structures of the 
molecule were devised and the chemical substance was experimentally reproduced and 
verified (Adler 2002). 
 
The epistemology of science proposed by Galileo is actually a problem-solving activity where 
mathematic and geometric representations of natural phenomena are crucial. The 
diagrammatic characters of the two disciplines allow researchers to decipher and ‘visualize’ 
properties of physical processes and their inter-relations which cannot be perceived by the 
unaided senses. Moreover, the concepts and patterns of reasoning and representation of the 
two sciences are universal, immune to subjective interpretations, and always open to new 
improvements and applications (Hacking 1997).  
 
In his treaties and letters, Galileo contends that no one should “… fix the limits for human 
mind … for no one can … assert that everything which is knowable in the world is already 
known” (Galilei [1613] 2008:104-105). He is aware of the multiplicity and complexity of 
nature as well as of the limits of human understanding. Hence, he suggests that scientific 
work must be considered a procedure of successive approximations towards better 
explanations. He observes: “There is no event in Nature, not even the least that exists, such 
that it will ever be completely understood by theorists” (Galilei [1623] 1957:258). Although 
confident that science will succeed in improving human understanding, Galileo cautions that 
scientific models and measurements will always remain approximate, however much 
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scientific instruments and procedures may be refined. Thus, he reminds fellow researchers 
that due to the complexity and mutability of nature and to the limits of both conceptual and 
technical tools, their knowledge and arguments can only be tentative and plausible: “ … we 
must content ourselves with what little we can conjecture thus among shadows” (Galilei 
[1623] 1957:255). 
 
Through his dialogues and demonstrations, Galileo advises scientists to be modest toward 
nature and to adopt a dialectical reasoning approach in their reports. The argumentation style 
proposed involves moving back and forth between contrary lines of reasoning using each to 
cross-examine the other (Finocchiaro 1980). Galileo’s redefinition of belief content and his 
blending of concept and procedures of investigation from astronomy, physics, philosophy and 
mathematics with pattern of classical rhetoric established a form of knowledge and 
argumentation which thrives on verification and consensus and which is always tentative, 
probabilistic and corrigible (Polkinghorne 1998). In this perspective, the content of scientific 
discourse is stable, but not static. Modals serve to attenuate propositions and claims. They 
mirror both the complexity of natural phenomena and the limits of human understanding and 
research tools. Besides justifying the reporter’s selection of one hypothesis as opposed to 
many other hypotheses that may coexist, they also bespeak the interconnection and openness 
of disciplinary realms (Hacking 1997). 
 
4 Epistemico-pragmatic approaches to discourse and meaning 
The implications carried by the term ‘belief’ in actual speech events has been a topic of 
debate not only in the sciences, but also in socio-scientific fields as semantics, philosophy and 
cognitive linguistics. Scholars of these fields highlight both the grounds of ‘belief ascriptions 
and their relation to the meanings and uses of modal particles. They comment on the 
complementary nature of each particle and its adaptability to meaning strands consistent with 
participants, context, time, goals and evidence supporting argumentation and claims. 
 
In particular, Stalnaker (1999) provides a pragmatic frame of the concept of belief and 
identifies its main components as: 
 
… the person reporting the belief, the content of the belief, the nature of the 
relation between the believer and the content that constitutes its being the content 
of his or her belief, the possible situations and time framing the beliefs reported 
(Stalnaker 1999:21).  
 
The cognitive linguist explains that all these elements interrelate and should not be neglected 
when characterising ‘belief’ content. He frames belief analysis as an epistemic process which 
requires taking into account the ‘mental states’ of the interactants and the ‘possible worlds’ or 
the reference frames they must share for successful communication. Stalnaker cautions that 
his formula for belief ascription should be considered functional only when characterising 
‘beliefs’ related to mental states engaged in ordinary speech. In such contexts beliefs are ‘two 
dimensional’ and, thus, narrow for multimedia discourse which draws on verbal and non-
verbal codes (Stalnaker 1999:26). After qualifying belief ascriptions according to the tacit 
knowledge shared by interactants and relative semantic, epistemic and pragmatic components, 
Stalnaker, points out that in science: “… one may explain concepts, not by defining them, but 
by using them to account for phenomena” (Stalnaker 1999:46). 
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Stalnaker emphasises the pragmatic nature of modal meaning: 
 
Modal terms are notoriously dependent on context for their interpretation. For a 
sentence using can, may, must or ought, to determine a proposition 
unambiguously, a domain of “all possible worlds” must be specified or intended 
(Stalnaker 1999:35). 
 
Thus, he argues that meaning is context-specific and contingent to circumstances, time and 
space, and defines unsound the practice of assigning modal functions to context-free 
statements. In this perspective, analyses of modal expressions, whether in general or in 
specific context of situation and culture, should be in light of cognitive, pragmatic, ethical and 
contextual strands shared by interactants. The interaction between these elements render 
meaning “… consistent with the speaker’s knowledge, or with some set of presuppositions, or 
with what is morally right, or legally right, or normal, or what is within someone’s power” 
(Stalnaker 1999:36). In turn, this complex interrelation constitutes the ‘possible worlds’ or 
shared ‘mental spaces’ contributing to effective communication. Therefore, the cognitive 
linguist proposes a framing of beliefs and modal categories attentive to the conceptual worlds, 
manual skills, presuppositions, extra-linguistic knowledge shard by the interactants.  
 
Stalnaker’s arguments about beliefs and modal categories is complemented by proposals of 
other eminent scholars as Austin (1970, 1975); Lyons (1994) and Toulmin (1980). The 
discussants argue for the rediscovery of pragmatic and dialectical elements which link 
thought, actions, words and meaning to the physical and disciplinary worlds. The holistic 
approach to communication study they sustain would require that sentences and their 
components be analysed in relation to: external reality ― the world of objects and events; 
internal reality ― the speaker’s own world, intentions, experiences, the normative reality of 
communities: shared knowledge, values, norms, and rules (Habermas 1979). This approach 
would favour a better understanding of both the relationship between language and the 
systematic investigation of natural processes. But it would also reveal the influence that the 
understanding of nature can have on the creation, organisation and meaning of verbal patterns 
(Hacking 1997). 
 
Lyons (1994), whose seminal study on the semantic of modal categories has inspired the work 
and arguments of the ‘naïve realist’ group (Coates 1983; Nuyts 2001; Papafragou 2006), 
proposes that linguistic studies should progress from micro- to macro-semantic descriptions. 
This approach would encompass grammar-semantic, pragmatic and cognitive strands of 
communication. In his discussions he suggests that the process which can lead from ordinary 
language use to expertise in field-related discourse production and interpretation depends on 
academic training, cumulative knowledge, individual interests, and acquired practical skills. 
Thus, Lyons distinguishes between notions related to subjective opinions and imaginary 
situations, which drive ‘everyday affairs’, and concepts framing facts, conditions, and 
situations which can be observed and measured in the physical world. 
 
Lyons divides propositions into two groups “… one having a neustic, ‘I-say-so’, component, 
the other a tropic, ‘it-is-so’, component” (Lyons 1994:799). He associates the former with 
subjective inferences and statements of opinion, which are ‘indisputable’; the latter with 
contingent statements of facts which can be both questioned and demonstrated. Lyons defines 
differences in modal descriptions available in the literature as ‘largely terminological’. He 
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attributes the hesitancy to extend modality categories beyond the prototypical domains to the 
fact:  
 
… that few linguists have even considered the possibility that epistemic modality 
could be anything other than a matter of the speaker’s attitude towards the 
propositional content of his utterance … and … take it for granted that modality is 
subjective, in this sense” (Lyons 1994:805).  
 
Thus, he proposes widening the epistemic modal category to include evidence-based and 
truth-conditional propositions. To this purpose, he delineates the difference between the 
concept of ‘truth’ and that of ‘belief’ by defining ‘factive’, ‘non-factive’ and ‘contra-factive’ 
propositions. Factive utterances commit the speaker to the truth of the proposition since they 
have “… an ‘it is so’ component that is qualified with respect to a certain degree of 
probability …” (Lyons 1994:800). Non-factive “… utterances are subjectively modalized, 
they relate to verbs like ‘believe’ or ‘think’, which commit … the speaker to neither the truth 
nor the falsity of the proposition expressed by its complement clause …” (Lyons 1994:795 - 
original indentation). Contra-factive utterances “… indicate the speaker’s commitment to the 
falsity of the proposition expressed … and include … wishes and counter-factual 
conditionals” (Lyons 1994:795). 
 
Lyons proposes an approach to the description of epistemic modals which combines 
linguistic, logic and pragmatic functions that the relative particles can perform in discourse. In 
light of these functions he introduces the concept of alethic modality and explains that this 
category of meaning conveys apodictic probability, possibility and conclusions. These 
connotations are grounded in either direct observation or confident inference from clearly 
demonstrable facts. Lyons details the multiplicity of meanings entrusted to modal elements 
and relates them to statistics and “… necessary or contingent truth of propositions … 
regarding objective intrinsic characteristics and variability of processes and events in the 
physical world” (Lyons 1994:791). He specifies that the epistemic category should be 
grouped into two sub-classes: one related to ‘reasoning about propositions’, the other to 
‘reasoning about the knowledge’ conveyed by propositions. The first which he terms “… 
subjective epistemic modality concerns the qualification of the performative component of the 
utterance” (Lyons 1994:808). This category is relevant to ordinary speech, where there is 
usually no need to ground modal meaning on verifiable quantities, measurable dimensions 
and scalar degrees. Lyons names the second sub-class ‘objective epistemic modality’, and 
explains that the meanings of the relative particles are governed by the factuality of the 
propositions. These refer to knowledge and evidence supported by verified models, precise 
measurements and reliable statistical data. Therefore, alethic and objective functions are 
relevant to scientific discourse where arguments are grounded in models of natural 
phenomena, controlled data of events, mathematically precise calculations of probabilities 
(Lyons 1994). The authentic statements which follow seem to embody well Lyons’ distinction 
between factive and non-factive utterances as well as to sustain his arguments for the 
widening of modal functions.  
 
During a visit to an art exhibition in Rome, an admiring visitor comments: 
 
1) Caravaggio’s Bacchus is a live representation of the delights that a good wine can give.  
 
This utterance fall well within the ‘I say so’ or ‘non-factive’ proposition class. ‘…the delights 
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that a good wine can give’ express the personal synaesthetic sensations of an art and wine 
expert. The statement is imbued with subjective perceptions grounded on a sort of transfer 
whereby the modal ‘can’ relates to the sensations of the human subject rather than to the 
functions of the inert substance. 
 
During an informal meeting, a friend suffering from rheumatisms mutters: 
 
2) Tomorrow, it will rain. 
 
The utterance is a likely complaint due to weather-related physical symptoms. Its association 
with recurrent body conditions gives the expression objective contours. Yet the modal ‘will’ 
bears subjective inference with scarce predictive power and no indication whatever of the 
nature of the precipitation, or the space/time extension of the event. As observed by Lyons: 
“… there is no reason to believe that either subjective or objective epistemic modality, in non-
scientific discourse, is grounded in mathematically precise calculations of probabilities” 
(Lyons 1994:793).  
 
Reported by a meteorologist: ‘Tomorrow, it will rain.’ is a factive statement. The forecaster 
draws on data from weather satellites, zonal humidity and temperature measurements, 
calculations of wind direction and intensity. The indications will also base on mathematical 
models and information about cloud types and reference scales of possible changes in the 
atmosphere (Iribarne & Cho 1990). Through elaboration and correlation of data, any member 
of the scientific community may predict the precipitation consistency, duration and extension 
with a good probability of being right. In the scientific statement ‘may/will’ signal objective, 
deductive and deductive conclusions based on calculations and tempered by knowledge of the 
fickleness of natural phenomena. 
 
The following fragment is from a report on the mechanics of the fracturing of glass caused by 
the interaction between silica and water molecules: 
 
3) The chemical reaction between the silica and the water can reduce the amount 
of energy that must be supplied to make the crack extend (Michalske & Bunker 
1987:81). 
 
The statement describes the results of a chemico-physical interaction between the atomic 
structures of the two substances. In set conditions, this process, can initiate the cleaving of the 
silica atomic bonds and establish the fracturing mechanism. The atomic structures of both 
compounds and the mechanism setting out the disruption can be observed and recorded by 
Fourier-transform infrared radiation and spectroscopy. The phases of the event can then be 
modelled by mathematical and diagrammatic means, replicated and verified in experimental 
conditions (Michalske & Bunker 1987). Therefore, the modals in the text do not signal 
willingness and sensations of the two inert substances, but alethic relationship between 
ascertained chemico-physical elements and their interactions in nature.  
 
After having characterised the semantico-epistemic and pragmatic elements distinguishing the 
objective modal subclasses, Lyons recalls the possible diachronic evolution of modal meaning 
from root to subjective epistemic. However, he emphasises the transition from lay-beliefs to 
knowledge-based inferences which are grounded on systematic investigation of physical 
phenomena, dialectical reasoning and verifications of claims. He considers subjective and 
objective functions of modality as latent and intermeshed in the production of empirical 
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propositions. 
 
Objectively modalized utterances … can be described as having an unqualified “I-
say-so” component, but an “it-is-so” component that is qualified with respect to a 
certain degree of probability … (Lyons 1994:800, original indentations). 
 
Lyons cautions that in constative speech domains, subjective interpretations must be filtered 
through objective, quantifiable evidence of knowledge and facts in order to free propositions 
from possibilities and necessities created by acts of human will. He restates that the 
‘objective’ modal classes convey “… physical possibilities and necessities performed by 
agents external or internal to the physical system within which these possibilities and 
necessities operate” (Lyons 1994:844). Lyons’ enlightening discussions also teach that in 
scientific discourse modals serve to attenuate not only concepts, actions and facts, but also the 
speaker’s confidence in what is reported:  
 
the very fact of introducing ‘must’, ‘necessarily’, ‘certainly’, etc., into the 
utterance has the effect of making our commitment to the factuality of the 
proposition explicitly dependent upon our perhaps limited knowledge (Lyons 
1994:793). 
 
Thus, the semanticist descriptive model is attentive to disciplinary knowledge, ontology, 
techniques of investigation, and verification of evidence as relevant to scientific progress. His 
observation that, in scientific discourse, subjective strands may intermesh with but must give 
way to objective and alethic connotations seems, in fact, to mirror well Einstein’s teaching:  
 
real knowledge is a combination of external evidence and internal response to that evidence; it cannot 
spring from experience alone but only from the comparison of the inventions of the intellect with 
observed fact (Einstein 1934:27). 
 
Austin (1975) considers linguistic forms necessary, but not sufficient to establish appropriate 
communication. He acknowledged the usefulness of sentences devised for grammar-logic 
studies, but defines them parasitic upon normal use and ‘void’ of actual meaning (Austin 
1975:137). Thus, he proposes a pragmatic approach to language study which accounts for the 
role that speakers, conventions, rituals, social rules and actions can have in “uttering words” 
for valid purposes. In this perspective, he groups utterances into two broad categories termed: 
‘performatives’ (operative), and ‘constatives’ (descriptive) speech acts. In the former class, 
language serves to perform actions, in appropriate socio-cultural contexts and circumstances; 
in the latter, it serves to make statements about facts, events, processes which can be proven 
as true or false.  
 
Throughout his discussion, the philosopher of language emphasises the dependence of verbal 
construct on context of situation, socio-cultural norms, actions and purpose of speech events. 
He specifies the elements which can contribute to the understanding of intended meanings 
and favour recognition of inter-subjective validity of claims by arguing that: 
 
… it is always necessary that the circumstances in which the words are uttered 
should be in some way, or ways, appropriate, and it is very commonly necessary 
that either the speaker himself or other persons should also perform certain 
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actions, whether ‘physical’ or ‘mental’ actions or even acts of uttering words 
(Austin 1975:8 - original italics and single indentations). 
 
Austin’s holistic approach to discourse analysis comes through his proposal that: “The total 
speech act in the total speech situation is the only actual phenomenon which, in the last resort, 
we are engaged in elucidating” (Austin 1975:148 - original italics). He explains that actual 
speech events involve complex cognitive activities whereby constative propositions can 
overlap with performative statements. At the same time, he emphasises the inadequacy of 
pure grammar-semantic analysis of speech since without reference to pragmatic strands of the 
content “ … one cannot always answer in a simple manner whether it is true or false” (Austin 
1975:143). 
 
Austin observes that the ‘truth’ engaging human search is relative to intent, context, time and 
purposes of activities which influence the meaning of utterances. Thus, he proposes a model 
of analysis attentive to foreknowledge of facts, at the time of utterance, features of the context 
and act performed, purpose, interest and intentions of the interactants (Austin 1975:145). 
Even though recognising the fundamental role of ordinary language in the evolution of 
knowledge, Austin calls attention to the epistemico-pragmatic factors which differentiate 
ordinary from scientific speech:  
 
… in spite of the wide and acute observation of the phenomena of actions embodied in 
ordinary speech, modern scientists have been able, …, to reveal its inadequacy at 
numerous points, if only because they have access to more comprehensive data and 
have studied them with more catholic and dispassionate interest than the ordinary 
man… (Austin 1970:203). 
 
He adds that in scientific discourse constative speech acts are backed by objective quantitative 
and qualitative data which commit the speaker to the truth of the claim and comments that the 
same specificity is not required in the perfomative utterances populating ordinary speech. 
 
In “Ifs and cans” (1970) Austin suggests that modals always bear ‘iffy’ connotations. He 
advises that particles should not be constrained within grammar-semantic schemata since “… 
their interpretations will be clear from the context” (Austin 1970:212). Thus, he argues that, 
according to context, each modal can imply: condition, doubt, consequence, stipulation, 
alternative choice, possibility, right, legitimacy, feasibility, practicability, supposition, 
opportunity, skill, motive, ability, action. In actual speech these implications are often 
interdependent:  
 
‘He has the ability to do X’ simply means that ‘If he has the opportunity and the 
motive to do X, he will do X’ (Austin 1970:227 - original indentation).  
 
Austin concludes his insightful discussion on modal meaning by suggesting that grammar 
study could become: “a true and comprehensive science of language by joining labours with 
philosophy and the mathematics as witnessed at the birth of science” (Austin 1970:232). 
 
Toulmin (1980) relates to Lyons’s and Austin’s pragmatic perspective on language and 
modality and suggests that the function of each particle should be analysed in consideration of 
the concepts of force and criteria. He terms force the basic logico-semantic meaning ascribed 
to the grammar forms, and defines criteria as “… the standard grounds and reasons by 
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reference to which we decide in any context that the use of any particular modal term is 
appropriate” (Toulmin 1980:30). The philosopher of science then specifies that force is a 
field-independent semantic dimension of modals (denotata), whereas criteria is field-
dependent (denotatum). Thus, the criteria components relate epistemic modals to pragmatic 
elements including intentions, purposes, rules, conventions and knowledge patterns of a given 
speech community. In other words, criteria embody the extra-linguistic declarative and 
procedural components of multimedia discourse which can regulate the coding and 
interpretation of discourse.  
 
Toulmin details the criteria implications conveyed by modal particles by considering the 
functions of ‘can’ in epistemic expressions. First, he defines the force or grammar facet of this 
particle as constant and generally implying possibility and probability of events, actions, 
activities in affirmative, and impossibility in negative utterances. Then he demonstrates that in 
different contexts of situation and culture, the criteria of use will determine whether ‘can’ 
refers to human physical or cognitive ability, dimensional capacity, linguistic, and social 
appropriateness or impropriety, moral obligation, legal rules, mathematical certitude, and 
physical properties.  
 
The philosopher of science points out that whether something is possible, appropriate or 
impossible can only be decided in relation to rules, conventions and knowledge patterns of 
activity fields. He comments that the problems concerning physics have little in common with 
those of either team-selection, aesthetics, or poetry. Thus, he emphasises the role of 
mathematical and physical evidence in deciding the choice and meaning of each particle in 
scientific discourse. Toulmin’s arguments seem to reflect both Lyons’s and Austin’s ideas on 
the subject: 
 
Our probability-terms come to serve, therefore, not only to qualify assertions, 
promises and evaluations themselves, but also as an indication of the strength of 
the backing which we have for the assertion, evaluation or whatever. It is the 
quality of the evidence or argument at the speaker’s disposal which determines 
what sort of qualifier he is entitled to include in his statements: whether he ought 
to say, ‘This must be the case’, ‘This may be the case’, or ‘This cannot be the 
case’; whether to say ‘Certainly so-and-so’, ‘Probably so-and-so’, or ‘Possibly so-
and-so’ (Toulmin 1980:90). 
 
After dealing with probability particles, Toulmin discusses the organisation of a scientific 
report, which he terms ‘demonstrative argumentation’. The layout proposed consists of a set 
of macro-linguistic, semantico-pragmatic structures whereby each component integrates and 
verifies the content of the other. In the analytic model, the claim or thesis poses the problem 
and anticipates its solution. The concurring parts firstly provide background information; 
secondly highlight new possibilities for improvement of data and understanding; thirdly; 
substantiate the evidence supporting the results reported. In conclusion, the argumentation 
deploys through a comparative analysis between the novel hypothesis, experimental results 
obtained and the findings of previous reports. Thus, the epistemic process activated through 
the presentation involves a critical evaluation of the congruence between the predictions 
motivating the research and the actual results obtained. In the report, the orchestration 
between conceptual and rhetorical patterns serves to activate a heuristic process which co-
involves the writer and readers in a dialectical interaction. In the intellectual and dialectical 
tension that establishes between the interrelated sections, the source and addressees, modals 
LSP Journal, Vol.2, No.1 (2011) / http://lsp.cbs.dk 
 
33 
 
have a pivotal role and influence both the argumentation and interpretation processes. 
(Toulmin 1980). 
 
Through his articulation of the report layout and content, Toulmin emphasises the apophantic 
nature of scientific argumentation, its progressive vocation and its foundation on cumulative 
knowledge, mathematical and factual evidence, doubt, questioning and verification. He 
observes that linguists and philosophers of science tend to neglect the role that mathematics 
and diagrams have in scientific discourse deployment and interpretation: “…the bare form of 
words on which these scholars focus on can only lead to a naïve interpretation quite false” 
(Toulmin, 1969:25). Toulmin then demonstrates that mathematical and diagrammatical 
patterns are integral parts of scientific research, reasoning, and argumentation processes. 
Thus, he concludes that better understanding and more effective models of scientific 
argumentation may follow if the analyses contemplate also the influences of non-verbal codes 
on the conceptual, procedural, and linguistic components of discursive practices. 
 
The foregoing discussions propose that discourse and meaning analyses should be addressed 
in light of the multidimensional relationships characterizing the physical world, technological 
innovations, inter-subjective knowledge, and representation patterns which can influence the 
sensory and intellectual spheres of individuals. The arguments provided demonstrate that 
modal meanings and belief ascriptions depend on proven evidence, purposes, interests and 
skills shared by communities of practice. Thus, they suggest that semantico-pragmatic strand 
issuing from these concomitant elements should be part of multimedia discourse descriptions. 
Besides opening new perspectives on meaning, the more comprehensive analyses would 
allow a better understanding of how the particles can contribute to research activities and 
discourse processing consonant with research field epistemology. 
 
5 Meaning and the pursuit of science 
As it is well known, science is a pan-cultural enterprise whose roots trace back to the efforts 
made by ancient people to understand and explain natural phenomena perceived by the 
unaided senses. The Chinese, Egyptian and Babylonian civilizations observed astronomical 
phenomena for their religious worship, for deciding routine affairs of life and for determining 
when to plant and harvest. They tracked the passing of time by the daily movement of the sun 
across the sky, while they reckoned the time of the year by either the phase of the moon or the 
seasonal movement of the constellations. Their observations of the heavens aided them in 
setting calendars, in surveying the land and in navigating on both land and sea. 
 
Babylonian astronomers observed astral motions primarily to draw predictions about human 
destinies and/or natural events. Despite the primitive equipment available, they made very 
careful records of the phenomena visible in the heavens. They used abstract thought and 
devised a number system based on 60 and a system of calculation which later led to the 
development of algebra. The number system devised by Babylonian astronomers is still 
present in our units of time and the pseudo science of astrology they contrived holds sway 
even in post modern societies. 
 
The Egyptians applied heavenly occurrences to their religion and prophesies, but also used the 
information for practical use in planning the layout of the pyramids. In developing the relative 
projects they displayed great technical skills as well as competence in systematic mathematics 
and geometry. Babylonian and Egyptian astronomers observed and charted the heavens 
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primarily to seek solutions to practical problems. They did not the observations to derive 
scientific laws and principles. 
 
The Greek cultures, which followed, rather than practical problems tried to solve intellectual 
questions regarding matter and its origin. In this effort, Athenian schools of philosophy 
fostered the birth of deductive and inductive reasoning. One of the most brilliant intellects in 
all human history, Aristotle (384-322 B.C.), was the first to argue that principles must be 
compatible with observation and cannot be based on abstract reasoning alone. But he 
considered mathematics and geometry technical disciplines, thus inappropriate for 
philosophers who study physics and cosmology. Aristotle’s theories of the physical world 
maintain that the sun and the planets were perfect, incorruptible spheres which revolved 
around the static Earth; that the speed of falling bodies is determined by their weight and that 
time is cyclical similar to biological processes as the blood circulation. Aristotle’s ideas about 
‘how the heavens go’ where incorporated both into Ptolemaic astronomy and into religious 
and Peripatetic teachings. This led to the stagnation of scientific research and sustained the 
conceptual and cultural belief knots which Galileo set out to disentangle.  
 
Galileo established the scientific method by direct observation of physical phenomena, with 
the aid of instruments, and by espousing concepts and techniques of investigation of both the 
mechanical and the philosophical sciences. This blending of knowledge and skills supported 
his experimental activities by which he discover the isochronism of a pendulum, the parabolic 
trajectory of a projectile, the moon’s mountains, Jupiter’s satellites, Venus phases. These 
discoveries shook Aristotelian beliefs about heavenly perfection. Galileo also discovered the 
dependence of motion on time and was actually the first researcher to time physical events 
and to establish that motion is time dependent. In the process, he invented metric-time and 
made time the fourth dimension of scientific measurements and investigations (Szamosi 
1986). Thus, he influenced a revolution in the conceptualisation of nature and man which 
paved the way to the discovery of more and more complex patterns of the physical world. 
 
Galileo presents his findings by interweaving verbal structures with mathematical, geometric, 
and philosophic concepts. He provides illustrations of the objects observed and of the 
instruments and procedures used in the research activity. This allows both the observations 
made and reasoning strategies adopted to be: “… manifest to the senses as well as the intellect 
of thoughtful men” (Galilei [1610] 1989:36). This combination of codes and operational-steps 
is a resource for  
 
… formulating degree, quantity, gradation, continuous change, continuous co-
variation, non-integer ratios, varying proportionality, complex topological 
information of relative nearness or connectedness, or nonlinear relationships and 
dynamical emergence which gives meaning a topological dimension (Lemke 
1998:87). 
 
In other words, Galileo established multimedia discourse whereby each code serves to 
visualise facts and concepts and to aid peer-experts to verify claims, and draw novel 
inferences leading to further investigation of the facts observed. Galileo claims that his 
contributions to science are modest, but indicates also his trust in future knowledge 
advancement. Thus, he emphasises the kairotic nature of scientific discourse and procedures:  
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There have been opened up to this vast and most excellent science, of which my 
work is only the beginning, a gateway and a road by which other minds more 
acute than mine shall penetrate to recesses still deeper (Galilei [1638] 1989:190).  
 
The history of scientific advancement teaches that new hypotheses and models can bring 
about new discoveries and representations of natural processes and objects with consequent 
novel beliefs based on verified knowledge (Quinn 2007). In fact field-related discourse 
domains progress through a constant flux of review and updating of concepts, techniques, 
instruments and terminology. Scientific communities are actually engaged in a constant 
search:  
 
… of congruence between the categories of our symbolic system in our minds, the 
signs of the linguistic system and the properties of the material world. The 
congruence between the meaning in our minds and the meaning in the minds of 
others is negotiated through agreement over the selection of appropriate signs and 
symbols. A negotiated inter-subjectivity is possible through the material changes we 
express in the world as we interact (Monk 1994:130).  
 
At present, scientific knowledge differs from common sense understanding and Aristotelian 
ideas in so far as it studies natural phenomena by stratifying them into a set of three realms. 
Each realm is constellated by numerous disciplines and sub-disciplines with their own 
theoretical models, languages and diagrammatic patterns. 
 
Realm 1 is the realm of the directly accessible material world of objects and 
properties that can be sensed unaided. 
Realm 2 is the realm of those things which can be accessed through 
instrumentation. These are initially proposed through logical reasoning. 
Realm 3 is the realm of those things which are beyond sensory experience and 
instrumentation but are accessed through logical reasoning alone (Monk 
1994:131). 
 
The historic and epistemico-pragmatic evolution from realm one to the more complex realms 
of observation has required time, dedication, development of new geometrico-mathematical 
models, instruments, and representation patterns by members of different cultures who belong 
to disciplinary communities. 
 
The differences between the grounds of beliefs populating ordinary speech and those 
governing the ‘possible worlds’ of the three realms can be appreciated by reflecting on the 
text-fragments which follow. The first three samples belong to a medical review report on 
chronic pelvic pain. The reporter analyses data from 79 longitudinal-based clinical studies 
involving a population of 1200 patients suffering from the syndrome. The review includes 
observations by clinicians, surgeons, psychologists and pharmacologists along with 
descriptions of symptoms by patients. The paper presents pain intensity scales and maps, 
diagrams. It details physical examination procedures, diagnostic tests and therapies elaborated 
by physicians in the effort to cure the patients. The statistical data quoted concern results 
obtained in 40 years of controlled and follow up studies. In spite of the trials and efforts, 
clinical therapies and surgical interventions appear to have had very limited success. 
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(a) Treatment of chronic pain may consist of two approaches. One is to treat 
chronic pain itself as a diagnosis, and the other is to treat diseases or disorders that 
might be a cause of or a contribution to chronic pelvic pain (Howard 2003:6). 
 
Text (a) opens the discussion and feature two modals may and might, respectively. In this 
context, more than possible ‘uncertainty’ may indicates alternative choice and/or disjunction. 
It also embodies a deductive conclusion since it relies on verified medical experience, 
recorded response by patients and instrumental results. The tentative/doubtful might implies 
uncertainty which linger on both the causes and treatment of the disease. The modal relies on 
deductive and inductive inference, doctors and patients reports and correlations between 
statistical data of single and cohort studies which “… show differing results and thus more 
evidence is needed” (Howard 2003:7). Rather than beliefs, the two modals convey dialectical 
reasoning, criticism and frustration due to the poor results obtained (only from 15% to 26% of 
the patients report temporary relief from the pain, whatever the approach and therapy).  
 
In another section of the review the author observes:  
 
(b) Surgery for advanced stage endometriosis can be challenging, tedious and 
frustrating, and in many cases cannot be performed laparoscopically. Thus, it may not 
automatically follow that these data are applicable to surgeries for patients with stage 
IV disease (Howard 2003:605).  
 
The can in this fragment, rather than abilities/capabilities, implies ‘at times’ as well as 
unsatisfactory results. The may has the connotation of ‘at times’ as well as implication that the 
invasive operation is not guaranteed to be successful. Again these connotations are backed by 
statistical data on the effect of laparoscopy on the patients subjected to the operation. The 
modals in the expressions have little in common with untutored-subjective opinions. They 
relate to experience, statistical data, instrumental skills and experience common to the peer-
experts who will be reading the report.  
 
The data discussed in the review-report lead to final remarks with modals which embody 
comment/advice/contingent conclusions and which imply also the intellectual and human 
commitment of clinical researchers. The clinical reports overviewed suggest the conclusion: 
“Diagnosis and treatment can be complex, and the goals of treatment must be realistic”. These 
crude remarks are however tempered with optimistic anticipations of probable scientific 
advancements: “… with future research, the psychoneurological dysfunctions responsible for 
chronic pain may be identified leading to definitive, curative treatments” (Howard 2003:608). 
The report data and comments on the disease are meaningful for the intended readers since 
they share disciplinary knowledge with the review author from experience accumulated both 
during their medical training and practice and while reading the report. The text and 
comments tentative bent represents well the complexity of the medical sciences due to the 
manifold differences between human individuals. The report is interdisciplinary, and relies on 
shared in-group codes and mental spaces of the macro-realm (Fauconnier 1994). 
 
Scientific concepts may recur in different contexts and in conversations among people with 
different cultural backgrounds. The following observation may occur in either everyday or 
specialist speech events: 
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(c) Oil will float on water, thus, any leak in the offshore oil well can be readily 
detected on the surface of the ocean. 
 
A lay person making the above comment may ground the utterance on direct experience with 
the observable event, on media reports, and/or may also have basic-scholastic notions about 
the behaviour of liquids due to differences in their density and miscibility. If based only on the 
direct observation of the phenomenon, the modal will may be classified as due to 
‘presumptive’ or inductive reasoning associated to conditional statements. If the modal 
concerns the physical properties of the two substances then it relies on deductive inference: 
cause/effect relationship due to the different densities of the two liquids causing the buoyancy 
at a specific temperature: 
 
salt water density 1.030 g/cm3 at 4° C, spill oil density 0.9942 g/ cm3 at 4° C 
 
A geo-technician making the same claim may certainly draw on common experience of the 
process, but he will also have detailed knowledge of the properties of the fluids for having 
measured their density with appropriate instruments. He has investigated the behaviour of 
liquids in laboratory experiments and carried out measurements of the phenomenon in 
different circumstances. His understanding will also be backed by interdisciplinary studies 
and visualisation techniques. In the specific case, the scientist will rely on pragmatic 
presupposition about the molecular chemistry and structures of substances and their influence 
on polarity and reciprocal solubility of liquids. This knowledge includes conceptual patterns, 
statistical data, diagrammatic representations of phenomena, manual and verbal skills 
developed during academic training and work experience. It will serve to describe and predict 
the behaviour and properties of liquids in set conditions and can be applied to solve possible 
problems in novel situations.  
 
The mathematical models and the physical properties of the substances, familiar to the expert, 
constitute the extra-linguistic frames of reference which codetermine the choice and 
denotation of the modals in this statement. Whether reported by a lay person or a scientist the 
will and can in the text have alethic function since they refer to indirectly observable physical 
properties of the liquids and techniques which are independent of personal beliefs and 
linguistic system features. The scientist’s utterance has also objective nuances due to the 
contribution of statistical calculation and of three-dimensional diagrammatic representation of 
molecular structures which he can reproduce. 
 
The concepts of objective and alethic modality may be more suitable than that of subjective 
beliefs in framing the modal of statement (d), in actual context of situation and culture:  
 
(d) An earthquake of magnitude 5.9 (Richter scale) can cause severe damage, if its 
epicentre is close to a populated area. 
 
If the reporter of the (d) is a lay person, the utterance may express a personal evaluation 
grounded on direct experience with the dramatic event and/or media-acquired information 
about earthquakes magnitude and effects.  
 
If the reporter is a geophysicist, he may be making a prediction of a possible event. In this 
context, the meaning of the modal will subsume knowledge about possible magnitude (M) 
and intensity (I) of earthquakes. The scientist can calculate M, or energy released at the 
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source, through a mathematical formulae such as: 
 
M = (logM0)/1.5-10.7 
 
where M0 is the scalar moment in dyne-cm. He can also calculate the I, i.e., the violence of 
the earth motion near the epicentre, by relating to the Mercalli scale. The scientist will also 
know that damages may depend on other characteristics of earthquakes, namely, location and 
depth of their focal point, direction of the energy propagated by the seismic waves, structure 
of the rocks and soil subjected to the event. Moreover, predictions of earthquake 
consequences on populated zones will involve knowledge of the age, materials and structural 
frames of the buildings and infrastructures of the possible areas affected.  
 
Therefore, the scientist’s statement would be grounded on cumulated disciplinary knowledge. 
It would also draw on statistical data, determined from measurements collected by 
seismographs, equations and diagrams, for establishing the time of occurrence of an 
earthquake, seismic wave amplitude and stress, wave front advancement and so on (Lowrie 
2002). The geophysicist can also refer to images collected by satellites, tectonic maps and 
other contributions from interdisciplinary research fields. All this data builds on mathematical 
models, instrumental measurements, scales of reference, and representation skills of 
disciplinary domains. The geophysicist’s reference frames are patrimony of a specific 
scientific community and should be considered independent of subjective beliefs and 
linguistic system conventions (Widdowson 1979).  
 
When an earthquake has already occurred, the scientist will use disciplinary knowledge and 
techniques to investigate and explain what must or might have been the causes for the 
damages and loss sustained. The information on which he will bases his explanations are now 
of a different kind, nonetheless, they should not be confused with speculations based on 
untrained observations and opinions. The earthquake causes are sought by analysing different 
data and ‘signs’ so as to formulate of an evidence-based explanation. The procedure followed 
to build more reliable evidence goes through approximations from inferences which are well 
illustrated by Austin definition of scientific evidence: 
 
The situation in which it would properly be said to have evidence for the 
statement that some animal is a pig is that, for example, in which the beast itself is 
not actually on view, but I can see plenty of pig-like marks on the ground outside 
its retreat. If I find a few buckets of pig food, that’s a bit more evidence, and the 
noise and smell may provide better evidence still. But if the animal then emerges 
and stands there plainly in view, there is no longer any question of collecting 
evidence; its coming into view doesn’t provide me with more evidence that it’s a 
pig, I can now just see that it is (Austin 1962:115). 
 
The complexity and dynamicity of natural phenomena, will rarely, if ever, allow scientist to 
have a complete and definite picture of events and processes. Therefore their explanations 
will remain provisional and in terms of probability of occurrences and plausibility of 
reasoning aided by energy scales, computation and correlation of recorded data. 
 
The previous examples relate to processes whose apparent results can be observed with the 
naked eye, but whose causes can be determined and explained with the aid of instruments and 
mathematical models. Science also studies the sub-microscopic world which is ‘beyond 
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sensory experience’ and which can be access either through reasoning and mathematical 
models, or through very powerful instruments. An example of this reality is the process of 
conformational rotation which can occur spontaneously in molecules with single-bonded 
carbon atoms and is studied in chemistry, biochemistry and pharmacology. The content and 
modals of text (e): 
 
(e) Single-bonded molecules can rotate about the sigma bonds holding the atoms 
together, but this rotation cannot occur in double-bonded molecules. The 
additional pi bond firmly fixes the atoms with respect to one another, there can be 
no free rotation about the carbon-carbon double bond (Amend et al. 1989:424). 
 
will thus be meaningful to experts of the specialist fields, but may convey little meaning to 
people outside these disciplines. In chemistry and bio-chemistry, the statements become 
meaningful owing to observations and comparison of natural phenomena such as light 
absorption and reaction of different substances to heat recorded in disciplinary studies. This 
knowledge has to be coupled with knowledge about the structure and behaviour of actual 
molecules in set conditions, and with models of representation and conceptualisation shared 
by the members of disciplinary communities. From academic training and observation, 
members of research communities know that the first statement is true to fact when: 
 
1) a single (or sigma type) bond links two molecular fragments; 
2) impediments to the rotation due to volume and size of the fragments (steric 
hindrance) are negligible; 
 
They are also aware that:  
 
3) in the presence of double bonds and steric hindrance, rotation can occur when 
the molecule is subjected to high temperature, UV light, or enzymatic action. 
 
The process is usually represented through a diagram which shows a graphic of both the 
rotation occurring in the bond of the atoms, the different energy levels and the corroborative 
conditions required for the event to occur in specific substances. In the description of the 
rotation process, the language structures vehicle factual information. They relate to thought, 
visual patterns, manual skills, and verbal and non-verbal codes acquired through disciplinary 
training. The graphic representation of the process and energy levels visualises a possible 
behaviour of molecule fragments in specific and well-documented conditions and leaves the 
observation open to other possible interpretations. 
 
Scientific researchers have evidence of the chemical and physical properties of each substance 
and under what conditions the phenomenon investigated may, can, will, must occur. Thus, 
they also know in which context the phenomenon visualised in the diagram and the 
description provided in the text are appropriate and true-to-fact. The epistemico-pragmatic 
strands carried by the modals allow researchers, in the specialist fields, not only to imply 
degrees of possibility and probability associated with the event described, but also to use this 
knowledge for valid applications of the chemical interactions to solve problems in chemistry, 
biochemistry, pharmacology and in other disciplinary fields. 
 
The properties of conformational rotation have been studied for long time, thus, the 
researchers have substantial evidence on the phenomenon for reliable inferences about the 
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event. In frontier research field as biochemistry and genetics the evidence is still insufficient 
thus the modals may, might and should refer to uncertain possibility/probability, expectation 
(Adler 2002).  
 
To a lay speaker, the content, concepts and events in text-fragments reported above may be 
only partially accessible, whereas to the initiated, they indicate physical conditions, dynamics 
of tectonic plates and properties of substances at subatomic levels. The researchers working in 
the various fields of science will know how to intervene in posing and solving problems about 
organic function/dysfunction or about phenomena of the natural world (Hacking 1997). They 
are familiar with disciplinary rules and techniques and also experts in interweave 
mathematical, motor-visual, diagrammatic, and verbal patterns, in order to illustrate both the 
phenomena investigated and the reasoning activities engaged in the inquiry process. This 
combination of codes and actions not only makes the evidence presented independent of the 
idiosyncrasies of individual inquirers, but also equips scientific prose with topological 
dimensions. The latter contribute to rendering the content accessible, verifiable and open to 
change. In other words, the open-ended nature of content matter, tools of investigation and 
representation strategies make the discourse domains inter-subjective, cooperative, and 
progressive, along a series of approximation to more reliable truths. Thus, it co-determines the 
meaning of concepts, terms and modal elements (Lemke 1998). 
 
6 Conclusions 
The foregoing discussion has presented proposals and evidence which appear to support the 
hypothesis that more adequate analyses and descriptive models of multimedia texts may 
require widening both the grounds of belief ascriptions and the functions of epistemic modals. 
In this perspective, relativistic models of modal meaning may have to be enriched with 
realistic considerations. The reasons for the enrichment have emerged through the reflection 
on the method and epistemology of science established by Galileo and improved by 
successive generations of scientist. These reasons have then been documented through 
arguments presented by Lyons and other scholars of linguistic sciences who sustain that 
beliefs, modals and discourse analyses should be in consideration of physical propositions, 
nonverbal patterns, and diagrammatic representations of disciplinary genres. In this 
framework, beliefs and modal connotations are made dependent on ‘possible worlds’ 
references and truth-conditional discourse with consequent definition of objective and alethic 
meaning categories.  
 
The arguments posed by the ‘realist’ group specify the importance of relating modal meaning 
to ‘probability inherent in physical phenomena, verified knowledge, rules and ethics of 
disciplinary realms. Since the concepts conveyed by each modal particle appear to be 
discipline and time bound, they can be considered historically and culturally determined. 
Even though limited in number, and in need of more extensive qualitative and quantitative 
analyses, the description of modal functions in multimedia texts, attempted in the present 
study seems to indicate that modal choice and meaning draw on statistical data and on the 
nature of physical processes. The implication carried out by the modals discussed seem to 
confirm that researchers evaluate the data through dialectical reasoning and critical 
judgement. Their propositions are based on interdisciplinary knowledge and research findings 
which are the main focus of scientific argumentation. Scientists use appropriate modal 
elements to shift responsibility to the data and other components of the research worlds. As a 
result, the modals involve the addressees in the reasoning and evaluating activity and open the 
text to cooperation and reciprocity. The model of analysis suggested would require a 
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discipline-driven approach in the study of modals and other epistemico-pragmatic structures. 
This would allow a better framing of the convergent evidence and know how that characterise 
scientific propositions and multimedia discourse.  
 
In general, the discussions and comments presented in the paper indicate that in scientific 
context, the physical realities and their mutability appear to have a greater influence on the 
choice and meaning of modals than the need for a scientist “… to humble himself or herself 
before the community as a whole” (Myers 1989:4). Toulmin’s cautionary words about 
relativistic interpretation of scientific discourse remind us that although decisions about 
scientific development may be taken by authoritative scientists:  
 
…the ultimate verdict on them remains an objective, even a factual matter. For the 
ways in which Nature will actually respond to our attempts at understanding her is 
something that goes beyond all tastes, and all human power to alter” (Toulmin 
1969:88).  
 
Thus, it seems reasonable to conclude that the complex and multiple fields of knowledge 
investigated by science and the relative discourse domains may be better understood through 
‘naïve realistic’ lenses. More satisfactory definition of modals in scientific communication 
may also require heeding Lynch’s suggestion that:  
 
“… to understand what scientists do, what the significance of their conversations 
are, how their writing should be interpreted and so on, you must become as 
familiar with their subject matter as the scientists themselves are”. (Lynch 
1982:147) 
 
In this perspective, researchers interested in analyses and descriptions of the discourse of 
multimedia genres should, like anthropologists do, immerse themselves into the culture of the 
disciplinary community and become conversant with its language, conventions and 
representation models. The ethnolinguistic experience could enhance awareness of how 
physical properties, experimental results, verbal and non-verbal codes interrelate and 
determine the choice and meaning of terms, concepts and modals in these domains of 
discourse. Familiarity with the scientific research worlds would then favour insight into how 
meaning is not arbitrarily imposed on modal elements. It depends on a dialectico-pragmatic 
interaction. Therefore, its description must be worked out in light of space/time-related 
epistemic, pragmatic, intra-textual, inter-textual and disciplinary frames of reference. The 
gaining of this holistic perspective on text and discourse processing besides allowing better 
descriptions of modal denotation could favour possible development of more effective 
pragma-linguistic research and teaching models.  
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